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CHINA'S FUTURE
A lecture delivered by

Dr. John Fairbank

at the Naval War College
October 31, 1949

Gentlemen:
I have been a student of one of your earlier speakers, Dr.
T. F. Tsiang, the present Chinese delegate to the United Nations. I
have also been a subordinate in the Embassy in China under Mr. W.
W. Butterworth of the State Department, another of your earlier
speakers. Consequently, I feel very fortunate that I appear here
after them. I speak as an historian w_ho has been associated with
social scientists. I have had about twenty years practice in trying
to deal with the Chinese scene in fifty-three minutes. This today,
will be briefer and so I will make it a bit condensed.
I am concerned with the historical and social science ap
proach to China and our China problems. And I want to do three
things: first, characterize the old Ch_inese society ; second, charac
terize the process of revolution which is now turning that society in
side out; and third, comment, from that point of view, on American
relations with China, past, present and future.
My main idea is that China is a different and unique social
system or organization or society, a group of people living in a
peculiar way of their own, and will continue to be so. And of
course, I assume that the United States is also a unique social sys
tem which will continue more or less in its own pattern. Neither
Dr. John Fairbank is Professor of History, and Associate Chair
man of the Committee on International and Regional Studies in
charge of the China Area Program at Harvard University. He is the
author of the book entitled, "The United States and China," which was
published in 1948.
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we nor they will change very greatly in our system of values, and
the general trends of our development.
My second idea is that China is in a state of revolution, by
which I mean gradual social change, not just disorder, but change

in the structure of the society, how it is put together, how the in
dividuals fit into it, what they expect, how they motivate them
selves in their daily lives '. . And, of course, I have to note that the

· United States is in a process of change too. You may not call it
y
revolution but still it is a rapid social change in this countr with
which we are more or less accustomed; we are developing. · So

these two societies are both moving along in streams of develop
ment.

Now a third idea that I would put forward is that China is
obviously .a factor in American security. It is desirable to keep

China from being our enemy, but that approach to China, purely as
a security problem, is not, it seems to me, the whole story. China
has to be understood for itself, as it is. In other words, we have to
maintain a high degree of objectivity. What is good for the Chinese

people, comparatively speaking? What will they take? What will
they do? It will be ineffective if we try to use China. I think our
frame of reference should be that we are trying to work with
.Chinese social forces, tQ influence the process of change in China,

not merly to use it. I think we have fallen into trouble through the
effort to use the situation without enough consideration about how
the Chinese felt about it themselves.
I have divided this presentation into two parts: first, the
continuity of Chinese conditions and institutions; and second, the
continuity of United States interest and policy. My effort is to es
tablish the continuity or trend in China, and in this country in our
relations to China, so as to make a projection toward the future-
to foresee what our relations may be in days to come.
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I begin, therefore, with the continuity of Chinese conditions

and institutions; and, as I said, I will take the first topic, the
characteristics of the old traditional way of life; then come later to

the question of revolution.

Now this traditional way of life, I

think, we have to take up under the four headings: economics, poli

tics, sociology, ideology; these things that we use in our universities

to make what analysis we can of how a society functions, what holds
it together.

I will go rapidly over these major topics which you

are, to a considerable extent, well acquainted with.

First of all, take the Chinese economy in the old traditional

way of life.

It

was a rice economy, or at least an economy of in

tensive agriculture, in South China, for example.

Now this in

tensive agriculture where you plant each blade of rice by hand,

called for a very heavy application of manpower to a small amount

of land and irrigation of that land with a heavy application of

water. This technique gets maximum land use, intensively, through
the heavy use of manpower. Manpower is cheap and you use lots of

it, lots of people. By doing that, in this economy, you can main
tain a self-sustaining mechanism-a lot of people living at a low

level but feeding themselves by intensive agriculture, putting their
manpower into small plots of land.

Well, that results in a dense

population and a crowded countryside.

As you know, if you fly

over China, you pass one plot of trees after another with fields in
between.

The trees are where farmhouses would be in Illinois or

Iowa, but each of those clumps of trees is a village of two or three

hundred people.

Where it would be an American farm family, you

have hundreds of people living on the land, using these half-acre

plots apiece, and so that means a low standard of living.

And the

result of this economic situation over the centuries has been a low
evaluation of the individual and a high evaluation of social order.

The individual is cheap, there are lots of individuals, coolie labor

is a glut; you can dispense with it, use it, throw it away. But because

19
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there are lots of people and these people have to live together,

there is a high evaluation put on maintaining social order, training

persons to be orderly, to maintain their status, to be polite,-all

these various things that you expect of Chinese. They live in a

crowded situation that we are not acquainted with.

Now turn to the sociology of this old society. Social struc

ture is centered on the family as a unit, not on the individual.

The

whole system is reflected in the custom of arranged marriage, just to

take one example. If you grew up in a Chinese family in the old style,

your marriage is arranged · for you-you never see, before your

marriage, the person you marry. The marriage is arranged between
families, between your family and another; you are merely the tool

of your family; you are used to create a marriage to carry on the

family. That all ties in with ancestor worship and all these various

things, as you know.

This practice, of course, in the old family

systems means a low evaluation of youth, as compared to age. The
elders are the venerable respected people; they are closest to the an

cestors who were also venerated. It also means a low evaluation of

out
stays

woman and a male domination; the woman goes

hold into that of her husband.

hold.

The husband

of her house
in his hou�e

As the younger son, he gets married in the big courtyard of

another house.

Ideally, the daughter-in-law comes in; she is the

stranger, the slave who works her way up in the new family.

Now with that social system based on the family, there is

another very striking characteristic of the old Chinese society
that it is a bifurcated class structure.

Well, that is a fancy name

for the idea that there was a ruling stratum and a mass of peasantry

below, say 80% of peasants living on the land in their farms and

villages and above them a ruling stratum into which they might
move, of course.

There was nobility; you could rise if you were

good, but on the whole people didn't too much.

20
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This ruling stratum was, you might say, a triangular arrange
ment of three dominant groups. It is a very interesting thing to
study because it had tremendous stability and is dying so hard to
day. On the three different sides you had three different kinds of
people. They all played ball together and were tied in with the
families. On one side you had the landlord families, people who
got a little surplus off the land. And maybe they weren't just
grasping landlords; they would even till their own land, but still
they got some surplus by renting out their land. So they had a
little leisure; they didn't have to work all the time, at least their
sons didn't have to work all the time.
So the landlord class produced a second side of this tri
angle, the scholar class. You had to have time as a boy to learn
Chinese-it takes you a long time to do it at anytime. The land
lord class produced scholars by studying the classics. And these
scholars, in turn, produced the third side of this triangle, the of
ficials, because from the scholars, as you know, the officials were se
lected by the examination system. The triangle was complete when
the official used his position to buy more land, and he could do it. The
official was at the top in this society and thus maintained his land
lord and landowner position. In this way the upper stratum main
tained its ideology, its social organization, its values, its way of
life with great stability over, as you know, 2,000 years, back to the
unification of the Empire in 221 B. C. or another thousand years
behind that through the period of Confucius and beyond.
Now that meant that the peasant was out of government.
The peasant did not participate in the activities of this ruling strat
um and did not decide how much he would be taxed or anything
of that kind. The affairs of state were the concern of the of
ficial landlord-scholar type, the top class. On the other hand,
you have to recognize that this old Chinese social structure left the
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government rather superficial. The peasant in his family units, in
his villages, took care of himself, more or less; he just paid his
taxes and the government was the rather thin upper crust over the
surface of this vast mass of millions and millions of peasants.
Now suppose we turn to the political structure of this old
China. China was a unit secluded geographically from any com
parable unit, so it was the universe, the Emperor, the Son of
Heaven who ruled everything. Barbarians were round-about it, but
there were no equals. The official class I have spoken of com
prised a bureaucratic government which ran the Empire on be
half of the Emperor using his prerogatives.
Then there developed in the course of Chinese history an
other very interesting political feature, namely that barbarians
began to come into China and conquer the place periodically-a
very interesting phenomenon and very important I think. The
reason this was possible was that on the steppe in Inner-Mongolia
where these barbarians lived as pastoral nomads, they developed a
striking power, militarily, through the mounted archer, which the
settled Chinese farmers couldn't withstand. One million, or maybe
two million at most, of these steppe nomads, out on the desert,
where it was too dry to cultivate anything with their type of cul
ture, could send an army like that of the Mongols, or later the
Manchus, into China and knife through any number of peasantry
and conquer the country. A very amazing phenomenon that four
hundred million, or maybe two hundred and fifty million in the
old days of China, could be taken over by one or two million of
these barbarian invaders. How did it happen? It happened several
times in succession; the Chinese would make a comeback and then
the barbarians would sweep in again a couple of hundred years
later and stay for one hundred or two hundred years. The Chinese
would throw them out, and they would come back in-a real se
quence of this thing.
22
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So the Chinese dealing with the barbarian is part of Chinese
history; it is part of Chinese society. It is an important factor of
their political life-this constant question of how you deal with
the strong, but uncultivated, barbarian menace. Of course, one
thing to do is to play him off against other barbarians. When the
Chinese were strong enough they did that. For century after cen
tury they would deal with one group of Mongols and then deal
with another group; they would back one against another in their
tribal wars out in the desert on the steppe, and in that way would
keep them neutralized, keep them harmless. But from time to
time the steppe would become unified and then they'd.come in. The
Mongols came in and ruled China for more than a century. The
Manchus came in two centuries later, and they ruled China for two
hundred and seventy-six years, a very long time. They did it, of
course, by a combination of diarchy in administration; that is,
rule by both groups, using Chinese as officials, as well as Manchus.
And combined with that there was what you might call cultural
symbiosis; that's a fancy word, but I think it is useful to express
the idea that the two cultures were maintained separately, side
by side. The Manchus kept their own culture, their own way of
life, their distinct entity as Manchus; they didn't inter-marry, they
didn't let the Manchus work. They kept them on stipends as
warriors in garrisons, kept them separate, and only by keeping
this small group of Manchus separate were they able to maintain
that power so long.
Now that resulted in a very interesting political tradition
in China; namely, that the dynasty and the bureaucracy, the Em
peror and his family and all the officials, stood together against
the mass of people because they were the ruling group. The mass
of the people were the people from whom you got the wherewithal
23
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to maintain yourself; you took it out in taxes.

The dynasty might

be an alien dynasty, but the bureaucracy still would stick with it.

That was a peculiar situation.

this element of ideology.

The secret of that, I think, lies in

I'll move on to ideology, the ideology of Confucianism

one of the neatest, most comprehensive, and most stable sets of
ideas ever evolved for the establishment and maintenance of social

order. The individual fitted into a status in society and was trained

to know how he should behave at all times.

Not the kind of

training you know about here, because you train people within
the framework of naval service, or military service, to know how

to behave at all times in connection with your profession alone.

Well, Confucianism is that sort of system in all aspects of life

how the husband should behave toward his wife; how the same

man as son should behave toward his father, or his mother-in-law,

or his child; or how this man, as a subject, should behave toward

his ruler. All this was worked out in minute detail and indoctrinated

in the Chinese mind along with the learning of the language.

You

began to study Chinese by studying the Chinese language in the

Classics.

The Classics begin by giving you this ideology immed

iately, so that you can't grow up, you can't become literate, with

out absorbing this whole system of status, relationships, how you
should behave-Confucianism, in short.

it is cast in that mold.

As your mind develops,

The idea is still very strong in Chinese life that education

is indoctrination in order to maintain the stability of social insti

tutions including the political power of those who are ruling.

Confucianism was not one of these authoritorian despotisms.

Now,

The

Emperor was all powerful, but he had to act according to the
rules of the game, just as any subject should act.

According to

the Confucian rules, the ruler was supposed to do the right thing

24
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at the right time in an almost ritual manner. If he did the right
thing he got tremendous prestige, and this prestige was believed
to have a certain influence. His good conduct gave him power
over the people. They would admit, when they saw his example,
that he was a good man and should rule, and so moral prestige be
came essential to the conduct of government. This rather super
ficial, not very powerful, government ruled the mass of the peas
antry by morale prestige, doing the right thing, therefore having
the virtue which gave it the right to rule. That idea is still very
strong.
Now the revolutionary process hit this old society. Let me
take that up as my second main consideration. The revolutionary
process, which began in modern China in the last century, is gain
ing momentum; things are happening faster and faster today.
Let's look at it· economically, ideologically, socially, politically.
To begin economically,-of course, foreign trade came in and it
produced an agrarian crisis, as it has in most countries. The
farmer who had been producing his own cotton goods on his own
little farm now began ..to find that Manchester and Lancashire
cotton and later Japanese cotton goods or Indian cotton goods
were splitting the China market. Finally, the factories came into
China itself, in Shanghai, Japanese or British factories and some
Chinese. When the farmer became dependent on the money econ
omy, this new cotton goods knocked out the handicraft industry
that had produced cotton for the farmer in the old days. Cities
began to grow up and industrialization came in, and that led, of
course, to a population increase, or a tendency toward population in
crease, pressing. on subsistence. You know that kind of economic
situation; it produces extreme poverty; we know and can under
stand it; you just translate the material terms for yourself and
you've got the economic picture. The thing we neglect, I think,
is the sociological and ideological side that goes with it.
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Well what happens sociologically? The family was pretty
hard hit. Why? Because in the old days the family was a self
contained unit; you functioned in it, working for it, living from it,
without any personality problem or wage problem or ownership
of property. Everything was in common in the family; you worked
in the field, you ate at the table, your father died, you succeeded
him, no money changed hands. Now in the new China, industriali
zation comes in. If you are in the city, or even in the country,
you do something for wages; money payments come in. If you
are a working individual, you get paid a wage; you are independ
ent of your family, independent of this little microcosm you form
erly would have lived in. And so the family doesn't have quite
its old cohesion. The mother-in-law can't control the daughter-in
law, when the daughter-in-law makes her own wages. The husband
can't control the wife, when the wife is working somewhere in the
city-his old control breaks down. Then freedom of marriage comes
along. That is just another symptom, in contrast to the old ar
ranged marriage, and so you get a youth movement. The young
people begin to break away from the old family system. They
say, "Age should not receive the only veneration; we are students
and scholars; though young, we deserve a chance to live our own
lives." The young students also use this old prerogative of the
scholar being top dog. It used to be the old man who had time to
learn everything in the classics, but now the scholar is the young
student, still the scholar, but young.
At the same time you break down the family, you break
down the old landlord system. The old landlord class begins to
become an absentee landlord class. You move to the city, nowa
days, if you are of this old scholar-gentry on the land. When you
move to the city you are out of touch with the peasants, you do
things for them impersonally that you used to do by personal con
tact, mediating their disputes, helping them in some of their

26
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problems. · The good side of the landlord-tenant relationship breaks
down when you are an· absentee; you just squeeze them for what
they have to pay you in rent. Thus, peasant disorder more easily
comes up. There are other reasons for peasant revolutions, but
peasant revolution comes along. It comes in a Chinese cycle;
actually, every two or three centuries peasant revolution has come
in the past, in the course of things. It began about 1850 last time in
China and is still there to use. Now this results in a great op-.
portunity, socially speaking; the opportunity to use the new eman
cipated youth of China for the purpose or organizing the formerly
inert peasantry of China, and that is the combination the Commun
ists have got. Before them, of course, the Kuomintang had . it;
that is the combination that wins, because you organize this enor
mous manpo:wer through it.
In politics, let us look at this revolutionary process in China.
The first thing was a response to the West by imitating the West.
The West was powerful, therefore you must imitate it; you be
come nationalistic, you act toward the West in the same way as the
West acts toward itself or toward you; you have a consciousness
of China as a nation among other nations for the first time, instead
of being the whole empire and universe with nothing but barbarians
around. And so you knock out the old dynasty, you kick out the
Manchus who are foreigners after all, and set up a Republic in
1911. Well, that's the first phase. In response to the West, ChinesP.
nationalism rose against the Manchus at last, knocking out the
dynasty. Then the question comes up, how do you set up this new
Chinese Republic back in 1911? You try the democratic process, a
parliament and cabinet government with a president and all the
stuff that the British were using. The British was the top, nation
at that period--even the Americans were using it. So you try
that; it doesn't work,- Why? Well, China is a different society;
it is not that kind of society; there is no way in the world of making

27
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parliaments work in China at that time.
down, Sun Yat-sen fails.

The old situation breaks

The war lords take over and in the old

Chinese style move in after the dynasty walks out, grabbing a little
area in each part of China as before.

What finally happens as the solution of reorganizing the new

China under the Republic?

Well, you know the answer-party

dictatorship was picked up by Sun Yat-sen.

He was anti-Russian,

on the whole, but was willing to cooperate with anybody.

He didn't

believe in Communism; but he used one of its principles for organ

izing the new China, namely, the selected group, the party dicta

torship.

The new elite stratum would take over the government

just as the official class used to, and operate things nominally for

the good of the peasant in the way the official class used to, carrying

on the old tradition in a new form. Of course, it is also a new tradi
tion, but it can't be a Western style parliamentary government. It's

a party dictatorship that hangs together, following a leader; it has

these Fascist, European-style or Communist-type overtones. Chiang
Kai-shek became the leader; he set up his regime with himself at
the top of the triangle of the party, the army, and the government '.
These three things he stood on; he was at the top of each.

was the system that organized China under the Kuomintang.

That

Now

it is very interesting to see, of course, that it is really the Soviet
system, in a certain formal way; it is interesting to see that the
Communists today carry on very much the same system.

You can

either say they got it from the Russians, or you can say they got

it from the Kuomintang who got it from the Russians, or you could

even find some evidence that Sun Yat-sen was working it out for
himself before he took the Russian example, before the Russian

revolution.

We shouldn't say this is just the Russian influence.

There is something in the Chinese scene that allows a party to come
in and take the place of the old dynasty, or the old foreign invader;

28
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this selected group that runs things. That appears to be happening
today.
Now what happened ideologically in this revolutionary pro

cess? Of coursethey began studying the West, the United States
-students coming here, using liberalism, individualism, the doc
trines that made the West so strong.

But then they found that in

their crowded country they had a low standard of living, with all

their traditions and different social context; liberalism didn't work

out. It was insufficient to maintain and develop the degree of social

order which they wanted.

The whole idea of Western individual

ism seemed rather chaotic and anarchic.

And today, when Secre

tary Acheson puts out his cover letter to the White Paper and re

fers to the fact that we will continue to hope for the triumph of

the forces of "democratic individualism" in China, it proves to be

a great mistake to say it. "Democratic individualism" is a golden
word to us, I think, but it is a garbage word in China because they

associate with this term individualism-the whole experience they
had of the western invasion breaking up the family, leaving the

average Chinese isolated without all these relationships that he was
accustomed to having, atomized-incapable of doing anything by

himself, so that he had to join a party if he was going to get re

sults. All that idea is in their minds. So "individualism" is not

the good thing we think it is, where the individual expresses him
self and his personality.

In China, it is a factor for disorder and

difficulty and breakdown; they are against it.

"Democratic individ

ualism" therefore, they immediately translated their way.

They

:ran editorials on it for weeks afterward and are still doing it,

using it against us.

They don't like it.

The Chinese Communists obviously have combined these in

gredients in the Chinese scene.

They show the most promise of

anybody in recent decades of setting up a strong political order.
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They have been using the peasant revolution on the land. Now,
of course, they have turned the corner; they say they will have to

industrialize, so henceforth it is a question of how much they can

get out of the peasant, how far they can squeeze him. TI,iey will
have peasant trouble from now on. Still they were able to use
the breakup of the old family, the breakdown of the old landlord

gentry class, to put their own system in. It is a modification by
which you are loyal, not to the family so much as to the party. So

you join up. And where the gentry does not run things locally the
party does, in this new way of organization. They are committed to
industrialization and they proclaim themselves intensely national
istic. That, of course, is a tough question-how far it is possible to
combine a genuine Chinese nationalism with the Marxist ideology

sent from Moscow. Of course we immediately say, "How about
Titoism ?" Mao Tse-tung immediately comes out saying, "The hell
with Tito!"

Now that is, I think, a Chinese situation.

In other words,

what Mao Tse-tung says is for political purposes. Personally, I
don't know whether China is going to be run by the Russians or
not, aside from the fact that they are all Marxists.
Well, in this situation there are continuing elements. A poor
dense population, facing famine in the year ahead because of the
disastrous floods and famine in North China and on the Yangtse, is
likely to be governed by a bureaucratic official class, a selected
elite, in this case organized by the Communist party and likely to be
strongly pro-Chinese. However, they may work it out with a
tradition of alien influence and alien rule.

Now, let us look briefly at the American policy in relation

to this Chinese scene.

Our contact with China began in our seek

ing access for trade in 1784.

And we got a treaty and extra

territoriality to give us greater access for trade in 1844. This idea

30
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of access for trade developed in the "open door", which was as
much British as American. The open door for trade in 1899 de
veloped further into the idea for independence and integrity of
China. So this idea of Chinese integrity and independence is more
�. than a merely economically motivated idea on our part. Our trade
=··. with China has actually been rather small most of the time. We
ii.·
have also had extensive missionary and humanitarian interests in
China. Part of our own democratic faith has found expression in
hoping that we could help the Chinese to get what we regard as
benefits from democracy, the American way of life. We have been
expansive in the 19th and 20th centuries. We have also developed

a certain sympathy I think for the Chinese personality-there is
something about the Chinese individual toward which we feel

rather sympathetic. He is in difficulty, he has a sense of humor,
he is very civilized, he understands people. We get on with him
usually, we understand his vices, we admire his virtues. It has
been this friendliness which is not ju st an economic imperialistic

ambition but also a matter of actual sentiment between peoples.

That is our background of a pretty good record, made pos
sible, most likely, because the British did the dirty work in the
19th century.

They fought the wars; we came along behind and

took the opportunities. We didn't get on the spot until recently as
the representative of the West. The British were the great West
ern representatives before. They took the rap in 1926 when China
was feeling anti-foreign. It was anti-British. Now, of course, it
is anti-American.
Up against this new situation-this new power with which
we finished the last war, power on the Chinese scene because of the
troops and armament that we have there, we preceded to make a

series of errors. We made some good tries, but we also made
some errors. And our problem now, it seems to me, is to study
our post-war record against the background of Chinese conditions

81
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and traditions and to chart a new course, not willfully, but with as
much preception of these long term trends as we can.

For that

purpose the White Paper was put out, aside from the necessity of

shutting off the Republicans.
news for us in China.

The White Paper was very bad

The covering letter by Mr. Acheson played
the document as though we had always been for Chiang Kai-shek

when General Marshall was mediating.

The Communists have·

jumped on that; they have said that the White Paper proved that

General Marshall never was a mediator at all-which is their propa

ganda lie, doing the paper injustice of course.

In general, we have

wiped our feet on the Nationalist government without, on the other

hand, ingratiating ourselves with the Communists.

Nobody wants

to ingratiate himself with the Communists; it doesn't work out. But

either way you take it, we haven't made much progress in China

with the White Paper.

You have to recognize that it probably was

not a help to put it out.

Therefore, we have to capitalize on the

does give us the record.

And don't let anyone tell you, like Con

advantage it gives us in our own thinking at home, because it

gressman Judd, that anything is suppressed and ought to be there
that isn't.

It is true the military record is not built up because that

was not in the State Department's problems.

The White Paper

gives you the story condensed in a thousand pages.

It

ought to

be studied, and our great opportunity in having it is that we can
use it for purposes of study.

So I proceed now to name what I think are some of the

errors which you can document from this body of documentation:

Error number one, American sentimentality or wishfulness and

hopefulness about China during the war, the big build-up about

freeing China, the great heroic effort that was going on.

But

actually, it was a pretty tough spot for the poor Chinese to be in,
and a lot of individual graft went on.
themselves from inflation.

People were trying to save

We built up a fine picture and came
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out with this policy that China must be one of the big five, and we
must help China to become strong, united, and democratic at the
end of the war. Therefore, we had a great hope, I think, which was
unrealistic at the end of the war, to start us off on our activities
in China.
Secondly, we showed bad judgment. We didn't look at the
facts of the local situation when we refused to see that Chiang
Kai-shek was on the way out, that he was going to lose to the
Communists sooner or later. His system wasn't getting the basis
of power in China in the form of a peasantry which it could use
for taxes and an army. On the other hand, the Communists with
their syst�m, were getting the basis of power because they could
use the peasantry to support an army and that would give the game
to the Communists. We refused to see that. We thought we were
so powerful we could change that ; we didn't realize how difficult
it is to get into China. You can get to the coast, you can get to
the main cities, but you can't get inland. Logistically it is a night
mare.
Error number three: I think we were rather naive, because
we put our faith in material things and, I think we all realize
upon reflection that no social revolution, no process in the change
of a society, the way people live together, and what they believe
in and how they act toward one another, no process of that kind
is purely a material matter. You may be able to slow it down by
raising the standard of living and filling the belly, but that doesn't
solve all problems. And we had a good deal of faith that by ma
terial means we could turn the course of the Chinese revolution-by
arms, for instance. It was probably unlucky that we had so many
arms on the Chinese scene, destined for many Chinese armies we had
been training against Japan and continued-about half of them
in the Lend-Lease pipeline after the end of the war, as we did in no
33
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other part of the world. We kept feeding in equipment to these
Chinese troops. As a result, the Chinese Communists today have
a better-armed army, with American equipment, than the Chinese
ever had. But they are an anti-American army. The arms moved
right through the Chiang Kai-shek troops which didn't have the
morale to keep them. They were much easier to sell. The Chinese
Nationalists had nothing to fight for which would keep them from
selling arms when they got in a jam, or surrendering them when
they were surrounded. And so this whole process went on, which is
recorded by General Barr and others in the White Paper. For ex
ample, Chiang Kai-shek's troops, being on the defensive psychologi
cally, would stay in the cities and on the railroads, as the Japanese
did. In the cities they had their artillery, but you can't use artillery
against the countryside. The Communists had no command posts,
no dumps, nothing you could hit. They were scattered around the
peasantry. You couldn't use the artillery of the United States to
defeat the Communists. Eventually, the Communists began to cap
ture this artillery, they bought up some of it. Then they were in
clover, because they could use artillery against fortified strong
points. And, when the Communists began to get some American
artillery and turn it on the little cities and outposts, Chiang Kai
shek's troops were finished.
Error number four was, I think, a wrong emphasis or wrong
proportion in our aid program to China. We put arms and eco
nomic aid first. We didn't have any way of dealing with the
social situation or the sociological changes. What do you do with
youth? What do you do with emancipated women? The Com
munists organized them, meanwhile, and we were sitting on the
sidelines. We didn't do much ideologically. We talked about our
own ideals, which are excellent, which apply to our country, and
which we maintain and defend. Yet those ideals do not exactly
34
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apply, in our terms, to the Chinese peasant. They must be trans
lated somehow; and we haven't found out how to do it yet.
Error number five: We were inexperienced about what could
be done. For the Chinese economy we thought we could send much
more aid than we could. We found that a backward, undeveloped
economy like China could not absorb the economic aid we sent. You
could get it to the dock; you might get into the warehouse, or across
the river at Shanghai, at a cost equal to the cost of a shipment to
New York, but you couldn't get it up country. When you got it up
country, you couldn't use the machinery we had put in. For ex
ample, we had a system of workshops for producing iron tools for
the farmer to improve his tools and production. We had a big work
flhop and tool plant for each province. One of the tool plants was
coming in crates off a barge; and you had to have a cement founda
tion for the tools. This meant a big local outlay, a lot of expense,
increasing the inflation and placing a heavy burden on the local
people to provide the foundation, even before you got the crates
unpacked. To get into production you have to train operators and
find them also.
Furthermore, we lacked experience in regard to the Chinese
political tradition. We didn't understand the mandate of Heaven.
The mandate of Heaven is an old Confucian conception, engraved
in Chinese psychology, like the election process in the United
States. One candidate in our presidential election gets a few more
votes. He may actually get less votes, but he still gets more
electoral votes, as at times in the past. He gets a few more votes
and the rest of the country the next morning says, "He is the Presi
dent." That's the majority rule, a bare majority sometimes. That is
our custom. The mandate in Heaven is comparable. The idea is
that, when a new contender for the supreme power obviously has
popular support organized by using a combination of persuasion
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and compulsion to work on the peasantry; he is nice to them; and
those who are nice to you, you knock off, and there are others who
are still nicer to you, and there are fewer of them to knock off. You
get them lined up; you get them organized, and so on. When a
· 1eader in China has done this, there comes a point where he has
the mandate of Heaven. He is in-he is the new dynastic organizer.
That situation came back last Christmas. Chiang Kai-shek has
been out ever since. When the leader is out, he is completely out,
and it is just a case of clean up. So it has been impossible for
us, whatever efforts we have made, to build up any strength against
the Communists.
I think we have to be more consicious of our own type of

strength, our own type of society-its own virtue. And it is a
virtue in my view that consists of pluralism which, I feel, is a fancy
word for a lot of agencies or expressions of power in the state, or
having a diversified situation where there is no one dominant force,
as exhibited in our having not only a public sector of government
enterprises, but a private sector of private enterprises. And some

times they are pretty big, but, nevertheless, these big corporations
which the Marxists stare at as monopoly capitalism, are not govern
ment. They are something different and provide a sort of balance,
so that we have in our system an element of strength with the
balance which we have from a number of different agencies on the
same level. And that, I think, goes with our whole concept of the
rule of law, including private property, which safeguards the indi
vidual in his self expression. There is an idea there of not having
the monolithic state where the party is a dictatorship, where the
state does all the industrializing and· the like. This doesn't mean
that I am anti-socialist or pro-socialist.

I think we are moving

along in a progression (this is just my personal view)-progression

where we are developing an increasing degree of government en
terprise.

But I think it is important for us to keep in mind this
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principle of a balance among the forces in our society so that no
one agency, association, or group is dominant.
Now, when we look at the Chinese scene, and most of the
other Asiatic countries, it is perfectly obvious that they are not in
such a situation and they cannot be, no matter how much we try.
Say we are going to help the middle class; it isn't the same thing.
And they are not our kind, in these sociological terms; there is
nothing much we can do about it. They do have this tradition of
the official class running things. The Japanese have it, and getting
them away from the idea is going to take a long time. We have
to compromise in a statesman-like sense, of retaining our own ob
jectives and:our own values and yet not assuming that we can make
them prevail in the near future. You can't just go out and Ameri
canize Asia. When you do, you stub your toe as we have in the
recent past, unless, of course, you look around for the person who
will play ball with us, who does subscribe to American principles.
You find a Syngman Rhee in Korea or a Chiang Kai-shek in China.
Our danger is that we are too ambitious about this, that we go in
and support these people and say, "You've got to choose-this is our
man. He is most like us, at least. he is not a Communist, so we will
support him." Well, I'm afraid of that, as a practical matter, not
being effective. I think it is not going to work too well, if we are
too ambitious about it. It works something like this. Chiang Kai
shek is on the spot, with a very tough post-war situation, inflation,
many difficulties to overcome, everybody unhappy; and, if he does
certain things to try to win peasant support, maybe he can under
cut the Communists. He has had his chance for twenty years; it's
still there, but in 1945 and 1946 we came along and we said, "Yes,
you must make these reforms and we will give you a lot of aid."
And . he says to himself, consciously or unconsciously, "O. K., I'll
take.the aid and won't have to make the reforms, because if I make
the reforms, I will be out, so I will take the aid." So the more aid
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ground. We don't know very much about it-it's pretty hard to get
the story out-but we know perfectly well that Manchuria is the key

to the industrialization of China. It is the key to the future stand

ard of living of the Chinese people, and the Russians are sitting on

it because they can use it.

Now here is this famine coming in China next May probably,

whether or not we hear about it. Manchuria, the big bread basket
of North China, is the place which can produce a crop surplus. The
Russians want that extra food in Siberia where the soil is too poor

and doesn't produce enough food.

Who's going to get the food

out of Manchuria,-North China or the Russians? Well, we'll wait
and see. In other words, we should play this-not as a doctrinaire,

ideologolical knock-down and drag-out, which is likely to lose us

Asia-but as power politics. The Russians are a gang; they are in

there for what they can get, and we don't have to get so much. We

can be more friendly; we can give more. Now that calls for a cer
tain amount of self-control on our part, because our doctrinaire atti

tude, I think, toward Communism has gone beyond the point of
careful calculation; it has gone to a sentimental or emotional point

we don't like Communism- it represents all these things, all these
uncertainties and things we don't like, police states, and what they

are doing in Czechoslovakia, and all that.
anti-Communism.

We sum it up in our

Rightly so, but this is not an expert ideology.

Mere anti-Communism is not enough to offer Asia.

Asia.

I think that we are backward in our ideological approach to

We know all about logistics and shipping equipment and

arming and everything else; we can do all these material things; we

are the masters of them. But as yet, we haven't got the ideological,

political, social, or social science understanding of how to get these
people's minds moving in a direction that we can go along with.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss2/3

22

RESTRICTED

Fairbank: China's Future

we give him, the less he has. to make reforms, the less capable he
is of competing with these Communists, or other people who are

out organizing the peasantry on the countryside through reform.

In effect, we give him the "Kiss of Death" to some extent. We can

do that in any country in Asia, if we go in too heavily.

We have got

to figure out some way of trying to support a non-Communist situ
ation without actually creating it.

We can't back the status quo;

we can't put people in positions where they rely on us and become,

as the Communists say, "Running dogs of the American Imperial

ists", in the eyes of their own people, which discredits them and

pushes them out.

To throw this out as a point-I think we are not going to

get very far with a big anti-Communism ideological line in Asia.

I think we will get a lot farther with an anti-Russian ideological

line.

In other words, we should avoid being doctrinaired.

Now it is very good for us to work out our own doctrines,

our own faith, what we believe in in this country. Obviously, this

country isn't going Communist.

We want to understand what our

ideology is and express it, believe it, but, when it comes to Asia,

Asia is so different and is so close to being a setup for the Com

munists, I think we would do well to
Russia.

lay off Communism and lay on

You see Communism is the fine dream.

It is the thing

you can do in �sia-to knock off the landlord or kick out the in

vader, who is the imperialist by Communist definition.

Commun

ism is a pretty good thing. to the poor down-trodden Asiatic, just

as an ideology to dream about, to work for. "All stand together
and we will have a new day; we'll liberate; everything will be
fine." It works as a rallying point, and attacking it, I don't think,

is our strong point.

On the other hand, if we go in for an anti

Russian line, we've got all kinds of material. There are the Russians
sitting in Manchuria, doing all kinds of dirty work in the back-
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ground. We don't know very much about it-it's pretty hard to get
the story out-but we know perfectly well that Manchuria is the key

to the industrialization of China. It is the key to the future stand

ard of living of the Chinese people, and the Russians are sitting on

it because they can use it.

Now here is this famine coming in China next May probably,

whether or not we hear about it. Manchuria, the big bread basket
of North China, is the place which can produce a crop surplus. The
Russians want that extra food in Siberia where the soil is too poor

and doesn't produce enough food.

Who's going to get the food

out of Manchuria,-North China or the Russians? Well, we'll wait
and see. In other words, we should play this-not as a doctrinaire,

ideologolical knock-down and drag-out, which is likely to lose us

Asia-but as power politics. The Russians are a gang; they are in

there for what they can get, and we don't have to get so much. We

can be more friendly; we can give more. Now that calls for a cer
tain amount of self-control on our part, because our doctrinaire atti

tude, I think, toward Communism has gone beyond the point of
careful calculation; it has gone to a sentimental or emotional point

we don't like Communism- it represents all these things, all these
uncertainties and things we don't like, police states, and what they

are doing in Czechoslovakia, and all that.
anti-Communism.

We sum it up in our

Rightly so, but this is not an expert ideology.

Mere anti-Communism is not enough to offer Asia.

Asia.

I think that we are backward in our ideological approach to

We know all about logistics and shipping equipment and

arming and everything else; we can do all these material things; we

are the masters of them. But as yet, we haven't got the ideological,

political, social, or social science understanding of how to get these
people's minds moving in a direction that we can go along with.
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